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Abstract 
 
Public debt is an important means of bridging government financing gaps. Effective and 
efficient utilization of public debt can increase economic growth. However, excessive 
reliance on public debt raises macroeconomic problems. A large gap between revenue 
and expenditure forces a country to obtain debt. Debt thus obtained further deteriorates 
expenditure side. High level of public debt holds back the government to meet its 
macroeconomic objectives of economic growth, price stability and a viable balance of 
payment. The major implications are sluggish economic growth, macroeconomic 
uncertainty, decreasing development, investment crowding out, inflation, higher 
unemployment, deteriorating social conditions and rising poverty causing economic 
destabilization which itself leads to destabilization of the state. Nation of such a country 
is often involved in corruption, organized riots, violent protests, strikes, man-slaughter, 
terrorism and other such crimes. In case of Pakistan, the major cause of poor economic 
performance is extraordinary burden of both domestic and external debt. The current 
situation is unsustainable and if it is not altered immediately than collapse of Pakistan’s 
economy is for certain.  It is therefore essential for the government to plan and place 
policies and structural reforms to take charge of the havoc being played by unsustainable 
level of public debt.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Public debt is a vital tool employed by the government to bridge government financing 
gaps. Effective and efficient utilization of public debt can increase economic growth and 
help a government to achieve its development and social objectives. Financing 
development related projects can help a country to build its production capacity and 
facilitate economic growth. In particular, borrowing from external sources enables a 
country to finance capital formation not only by mobilizing domestic savings but also by 
tapping into foreign capital surplus. Foreign borrowing can thus lead to more rapid 
growth. For example, foreign borrowing increased resource availability and contributed 
to economic growth in South Asian countries. Borrowing allows a country to invest and 
consume beyond the limit of current production, and can be conducive to economic 
growth. 
 
However, if the public debt is not efficiently managed than it imposes the biggest curse 
on the economy. Unfortunately, Pakistan was not as fortunate and efficient in managing 
and utilizing its debt as compared to other South Asian countries. There is a growing 
recognition in Pakistan of the macroeconomic consequences of high levels of public debt 
resulting from the cumulative impact of large and growing budget deficits and the 
affiliated needs for borrowing. The heavy burden of debt servicing on the budget has 
frequently been highlighted by government, media and concerned citizens. In recent 
years, it has emerged as the biggest claimant of public resources, even more than defense 
expenditure and outlays on development. The resulting resource squeeze has implied a 
cut back in expenditures on social development, economic infrastructure, subsidies, etc. 
In fact, there are concerns that the country is effectively caught in a 'debt trap' whereby a 
high existing level of outstanding debt implies a high level of interest payments which 
lead to a large budget deficit that has to be financed by correspondingly large borrowings 
which add to the debt and so on. The result is explosive growth in debt and budget 
deficits which creates fundamental macro economic imbalances and has a number of 
unfavorable consequences including the 'crowding out' of the private sector and a decline 
in private investment through rise in interest rates and/or a rise in the current account 
deficit in the balance of payments.  
 
Budget deficits can be financed in four ways; (i) borrowing domestically, (ii) borrowing 
abroad, (iii) running down foreign exchange reserves and (iv) by printing money. Each 
form of financing is associated with a major macro economic imbalance. Money printing 
is associated with inflation; foreign reserve use with the onset of an exchange crisis; 
foreign borrowing with an external debt crisis; and domestic borrowing with higher real 
interest rates and possibly explosive debt dynamics. In the case of high domestic 
borrowings also, the budget deficit eventually get monetized. This creates strong 
inflationary pressures on the economy and the possibility of hyper inflation. Inappropriate 
public debt management raises macroeconomic risks, impede economic growth, and 
hinder economic development. For example, high public debt demand can increase the 
domestic interest rate thereby crowding out private investment. An escalating external 
public debt stock increases the probability of default, raising the interest risk premium 
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charged by creditors. High interest payments further enlarge a country's public debt 
obligations, accelerate budget outlays, and squeeze capital investment and social 
expenditure. In extreme cases, governments can be forced into defaulting on public debt, 
which tarnishes a country's reputation and makes further borrowing difficult. All of these 
actions are likely to precipitate capital flight and spark financial crisis.  
 
2 Data 
 
Pakistan’s total public debt and domestic and external debt over the last three decades are 
summarized in Table 1 at Annex A. Table 2 gives the growth of different economic 
indicators over the last two decades. Table 3 traces the components of public expenditure 
over the last two decades. Table 4 relates the debt indicator to GDP and revenues. Table 5 
gives the trend of external debt in terms of long term and short/medium term debt. Table 
6 relates the total debt and debt servicing to export. Table 7 gives the yearly export, 
import and interest payment since last decade. Table 8 gives external debt sustainability 
indicators. 
 
Graph 1 at Annex B shows the trend of increasing domestic and external debt over the 
years. Graph 2 shows total revenue, expenditure, interest payments trend from 1981 to 
2008. Graph 3 gives growth rates trend of different economic indicators since 1981. 
Graph 4 shows interest payment, defense expenditure & development expenditure as % 
of total expenditure trend from 1981 to 2008. Graph 5 trend of short term and long term 
external debt from 1991 to 2008. Graph 6 shows total debt servicing, principal payment 
& interest payment trend from 1991 to 2008. Graph 7 shows trend in external debt 
sustainability indicators from 1991 to 2008. Graph 8 shows external debt & liabilities to 
foreign exchange earning from 1991 to 2008. 
 
There are several points that emerge from a systematic examination of the evolution of 
Pakistan’s public debt problem in its historical context. First, the debt problem has been 
in making for a long time. Second, by all indicators of debt burden, the debt problem has 
continued to grow notwithstanding fiscal adjustment in the previous few years. Third, the 
nature of public debt problem has changed significantly over the last decade, the debt is 
now driven largely by interest rate costs and the debt indicators are worsening because 
the key growth rates of GDP, revenues and exports have all declined sharply. It is also 
evident from most indicators that debt burden situation showed some improvement in 
earlier years of this century but it has again started to worsen with much greater pace. In 
the light of this data, it can be forecasted that if the current trend gets a firm hold than 
Pakistan’s economic collapse is for certain. 
3 Pakistan’s Public Debt Burden - Historical Context 
 
The alarm signals about the rising burden of public debt should have gone up a long time 
ago. During the 11 years of Zia rule, 1977–88, the public debt grew six folds reflecting 
large and growing fiscal deficits. The debt grew by the average annual rate of 17.7 
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percent in nominal terms and nearly 10 percent in real terms during this period. The rate 
of growth of real debt was substantially higher than the growth rate of GDP and exceeded 
growth of government revenues. The main source of growth in real debt was the large 
primary deficit. But the cost of borrowing, though low on average, was also increasing 
steadily during 1977–88 as a large portion of domestic debt was raised through very 
costly borrowing from non-bank sources (i.e. National Saving Schemes). As Table 4 
shows, the ratio of debt to GDP increased from 48.16 percent in 1980-81 to 81 percent in 
1988- 89. Interest payments on debt in the budget increased from 12 percent of the 
revenues to 28 percent over the same period.  
The debt problem with which the democratic governments struggled, although 
unsuccessfully, during the 1990’s decade was to a considerable extent inherited from the 
Zia period. The debt burden has been made much worse, however, by the inability or 
unwillingness of elected leaders to reduce the fiscal deficit significantly, a slowing 
economy, and last but not least a marked falling off in growth in real revenues in the 
1990s. Pakistan's debt situation reached unsustainable level by 1999 because of 
persistence of large fiscal and current account deficits during the last two decades. The 
“twin deficits” resulted in an explosive accumulation of both domestic and external debt. 
Domestic debt grew at an average annual rate of almost 28 per cent during the first half 
of the 80's; 22 percent during the second half and 16 percent during the first nine years of 
the 90's. In other words; Pakistan's total external debt and foreign exchange liabilities 
which stood at $ 9 billion in 1980-81, reached almost $ 22 billion by the end of the 80's 
and by 97-98 touched a high figure of $ 42.7 billion. It is not surprising that the debt 
indicators which relate debt or debt service to revenues have shown much greater 
deterioration in the 1990s than the indicator relating debt to GDP. While the ratio of 
public debt to GDP increased further from 82.6 percent in 1989-90 to over 100 percent in 
1998-99, the ratio of debt to revenues increased from over 400 percent to 600 percent and 
the proportion of interest payments to revenues rose to well over 40 percent.  
 
The external debt and foreign exchange liabilities grew at an average rate of 2.0 per cent 
per annum in the first half of the 80's, 17.7 per cent in the second half; and 6.5 percent 
during the nine years of the 90's.Such a sharp build up in both domestic and external debt 
have had serious implications for the country's budgetary as well as balance of payments 
situation. In 80-81,debt servicing as percentage of total revenue was 11.6 percent, 
reached 38 per cent by the end of the 80's and was further up to 64 per cent by 98-99. 
Similarly, over the years, Pakistan's external debt servicing liability continued to rise as 
high as $ 6 to 7 billion by 98-99.  
 
Pakistan entered the 21 Century with serious financial problems. Public debt exceeded 
90% of its GDP, over 600% of its annual revenues, and debt servicing accounted for over 
half of current revenues. In 2001, Pakistan was the only country in South Asia to be 
classified as a severely indebted country by the World Bank. Due to the inability to 
service external debt, there were several consecutive rounds of debt rescheduling by Paris 
Club members and one from the quasi-London Club between 1998 and 2001. Pakistan 
had to seek exceptional financing arrangements from the International Monetary Fund in 
January 1999, after facing a severe balance of payments' crisis. This outcome was the 
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result of persistent and rising fiscal deficits, stagnant export receipts, declining worker 
remittances, and large current account deficits.  
 
Pakistan economy experienced some improvements during the earlier years of this 
century. Growth some what accelerated, and most macroeconomic indicators improved. 
Public debt indicators also showed significant improvement. Modest growth in public 
debt, coupled with the growth in nominal GDP, led to a significant fall in public debt to 
GDP ratio, from 81.4% in 2001/02 to 56.1% in FY 2006. Over the same period, domestic 
public debt to GDP ratio fell from 40.4% to 29.9%, while the external public debt to GDP 
ratio fell from 41.0% to 26.2%. The improvement in the public debt to GDP ratio in 
FY06 was due to the fact that both domestic and external debt grew slower than GDP. 
The growth in domestic debt has been faster than that of external debt. It rose by about 
5.9% while external public debt grew by about 5.0% relative to the previous year. Total 
public debt stock stood at around Rs 4363 billion, about 5.5%, higher than the previous 
year, of which domestic public debt consists of about Rs 2041 billion. As a result of a 
stronger rise in domestic debt, the share of external public debt in total public debt 
decreased from 50.4% in FY2002/03 to 46.7% in 2005/06. 
 
But this trend didn’t last long. Pakistan again started facing huge fiscal and current 
account deficit in last few years. More damage has however, been done to public debt in 
the current fiscal year due to a further widening of the fiscal and current account deficits, 
increased borrowing from domestic and external sources to finance the deficits, and a 
sharper alteration of the exchange rate. Both domestic and external debt has faced sharp 
increase in the current fiscal year. Domestic debt has increased to Rs 3 trillion, while 
external debt has increased to Rs 3.4 trillion. Public debt as a percentage of GDP, which 
stood at 55.2 percent in June 2007 has increased to 61 percent in current fiscal year – an 
increase of almost 6 percentage points of GDP in one year. Public debt as percentage of 
revenue stood at 370 percent by March 2008 has increase to 441 percent in current fiscal 
year – an increase of 71 percentage points of revenue. Fiscal year 2007-08 has also 
witnessed violation of various elements of the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation 
Act 2005. Under the act, the revenue deficit (total revenue minus current expenditure) 
was to become zero by end-June 2008. As a consequence of large fiscal slippages, the 
revenue deficit has increased to be Rs. 287 billion or 2.7 percent of GDP- a violation of 
the Act. Similarly, the Act also requires that public debt as percentage of GDP must 
decline by 2.5 percentage points each year. Instead of declining, public debt has increased 
over the last year- once again a clear violation of the Act. The key to the success of 
reducing public debt burden includes: a reduction in fiscal and current account deficits 
and stability in the exchange rate. A declining public debt would release government 
resources for public sector investment, would enable private sector to borrow more 
(crowding-in) for investment, and thus promote growth. 
4 Macroeconomic Implications of Public Debt 
 
Public debt raised through different sources has different macroeconomic implications. 
Borrowing directly from central banks is equivalent to printing money. It increases the 
reserve money which in turn translates into monetary expansion. This approach is thus 
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highly inflationary and is generally discouraged. Borrowing from domestic commercial 
banks is less inflationary, although it may crowd out private investment. Government 
borrowing from the non-banking sector has no effect on the money supply and hence no 
implications for interest rates and inflation from the supply side. However, the debt held 
by people can exert an upward pressure on interest rates from the demand side. 
Borrowing from non-banking sector is also comparatively expensive increasing the debt 
servicing burden of the economy. On the external side, excessive reliance on foreign 
borrowing exposes a country to numerous risks. Excessive foreign borrowing and its 
improper use generate severe debt service obligations and can constrain economic 
policies and growth. 
 
In order to evaluate the implications of public debt on economy I have presented the 
effects of public debt on economy systematically. 
4.1 Public Debt and Development 
 
When a nation spends more than half of total revenue to finance one budgetary item, 
leaving aside only half of revenue to be spent on defense, civil administration, 
development projects, education, health, etc, what would be the state of country's 
education, health, physical infrastructure and defense? Country's physical and social 
infrastructure and irrigation system were bound to deteriorate. How can the government 
continue to provide raise in government servants' salaries, which are undoubtedly highly 
underpaid? This resulted in deterioration in governance. 
 
The same is the case with Pakistan. In 1990s, more than half of the total revenues were 
consumed for debt servicing alone which forced the government to cut Public Sector 
Development Program (PSDP). The country's infrastructure, both physical and human, 
started deteriorating because allocation to these sectors were started declining as 
percentage of GDP. Since the private sector and the public sector investments are 
harmonizing in nature, the decline in public sector investment also resulted in decline in 
private sector investment. Therefore, total investment which used to be 19 to 20 per cent 
of GDP in early 90's continued to decelerate and reached 15-16 percent level by the end 
of the 90s’. 
 
The onslaught of rising interest payments continued to crowd out not only development 
spending but defense spending as well. It is beyond doubt that Pakistan's fiscal crises in 
the 80's and the 90's were interest payment driven. As depicted in table 3, Interest 
payments, which used to be Rs 6 billion in 80-81 as compared with 15 billion on defense 
spending and 26 billion of development spending out performed both by a wide margin. 
By 93-94 interest payment and defense budget came at par at Rs 91 billion but interest 
payment surpassed development spending at Rs 71 billion and then there was no looking 
back thereafter. Interest payments continued to soar and by end of the 90s these were as 
high as Rs 262 billion against Rs 151 billion for defense and Rs 90 billion for 
development. As shown in table 4, Interest payment as % of revenue was at 51% while 
development expenditure as % of revenue was at 19% in 1999 Apart from slight 
improvement in the initial years of 21st century, the complexion of the expenditure has 
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again deteriorated. The priorities in our federal budgets have been upside down. One 
would assume that in an impoverished and developing country like ours, developmental 
expenditure would receive the highest priority and, in case of shortage of resources, 
would be the last item to be reduced. In our federal budgets, the reverse has been true. In 
2007-08, because of the budgetary crunch, there was an acute need to reduce the overall 
expenditure. This was done mainly by reducing the development expenditure from the 
estimated provision of Rs 520 billion to actual expenditure of Rs 490 billion. The current 
expenditure, on the other hand, increased from the estimate of Rs 1056 billion to Rs 1400 
billion. In the current year, interest payment stands at Rs. 600 billion, development 
expenditure at Rs 493 billion and defense expenditure at Rs. 275 billion. In terms of % of 
total revenue, interest payment stands at 41%, development expenditure at 33.4% and 
defense expenditure at 18%. Pakistan is facing all sorts of problem in every sector as 
there has nothing being done to improve the infrastructure of our country. Currently the 
most severe problems are the energy crisis and the water shortage. Among the two 
problems especially the energy crisis should have been addressed long time ago. But 
limited resources to deploy for development have held back government to start 
reasonable major development projects in the country. 
4.2 Debt Accumulating More Debt 
 
What happens when a government borrows to meet the revenue - expenditure gap? 
Naturally the debt will accumulate. The stock of public debt (debt payable in rupees and 
foreign debt in rupee terms) stood at Rs 155 billion by end of the 1970's and by end of the 
80's another Rs 646 billion was added which caused public debt to rise at Rs 801 billion. 
But by end of the 90's, another Rs 2430 billion was added to the public debt, which stood 
at Rs 3231 billion. The absolute number of public debt is not much of interest. What is 
more damaging is the burden of the public debt, which means as percentage of GDP or 
total revenue. At the end of 70's, the public debt was 56 per cent of GDP or 317 per cent 
of total revenue. It rose to 92 per cent of GDP or 505 per cent of the revenue by the end 
of the 80's.It was over 100 per cent of GDP and 630 per cent of the revenues by the end 
of the 90's.  
 
The situation was some how improved during the period of 2001 to 2004. In this period 
the accumulation of debt was not as rapid as the previous period. But this trend didn’t last 
long. From 2005 the public debt again started accumulating with more pace than the 
previous period. In the last four years there has been an increase of Rs. 2600 billion in 
public debt. This reflects a 69% increase in the debt stock in last four years. By any 
standard, this is a horrifying number for any country. 
4.3 Debt Overhang 
 
The term “debt overhang” indicates a situation in which a debt is so large that any 
earnings generated by new investment projects are entirely appropriated by existing debt 
holders, and hence even projects with a positive net present value cannot reduce the debt 
or result in the slowing of economic growth. As sovereign governments service their debt 
by taxing firms and households, high levels of debt imply an increase in the economic 
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sector’s expected future tax burden. Debt overhang characterizes a situation in which this 
future debt burden is perceived to be so high that it acts as a disincentive to current 
investment. Investors think that the proceeds of any new project will be taxed away to 
service the pre-existing debt. A weaker version requires only uncertainty on the part of 
lenders to investors who may not be sure whether their claims will take precedence over 
or be superseded by the government’s taxing power. Lower levels of current investment, 
in turn, lead to lower growth and, for a given tax rate, lower government revenues, lower 
ability to pay, and lower expected value of the debt. Therefore, countries that suffer from 
debt overhang will have no net resource flows.  
4.4 Public Debt and Private Investment Crowding Out 
 
In economics, crowding out theoretically occurs when the government expands its 
borrowing to finance increased expenditure or tax reduction, crowding out private sector 
investment by way of higher interest rates. If increased borrowing leads to higher interest 
rates by creating a greater demand for funds and hence a higher "price", the private 
sector, which is sensitive to interest rates will likely reduce investment due to a lower rate 
of return. This is the investment that is crowded out. The weakening of fixed investment 
and other interest-sensitive expenditure counteracts to varying extents the expansionary 
effect of government deficits. More importantly, a fall in fixed investment by business 
can hurt long-term economic growth of the supply side, i.e., the growth of potential 
output. 
 
The same thing happened with Pakistan. Pakistan has been facing fiscal deficit for which 
the government had to borrow heavily from the banking system to finance its fiscal 
deficit, pushing interest rates upward. On the other hand, the government continued to 
offer very high interest rates on various instruments of National Savings Scheme(NSS) to 
attract resources in this scheme as it was the major source of government borrowing from 
the non-bank sources. That's why during the 80's and 90's the rates of return on various 
NSS instruments were exceptionally high.  
 
Consequently the overall interest rates were not conducive for investors within the 
country. Because of the crowding out on the one hand and decline in public sector 
investment on the other, the total investment continued to decline in the 1990s resulting 
in slowing down of economic activity in the country. The same has been depicted in table 
2, where it is evident that investment growth rate was very low on the average during the 
1990s 
 
In addition to that, adverse law and order situation in most part of the 90's, as well as 
inconsistencies in policies, frequent adjustments in exchange rate, senseless taxation and 
freezing of foreign currency accounts badly damaged investors’ confidence. 
 
Things started to improve in the start of this century. With economic growth Pakistan was 
able to sustain the debt or decrease its debt growth rate. But later on things again started 
deteriorating. Growth again slowed down. Due to huge twin deficit government 
borrowing has reached unsustainable level. To make the situation worse, law and order 
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situation in Pakistan is not conducive for investors. The political instability in the country 
is also driving the investors out of our country which will cause the growth to further 
halt.  
4.5 Public Debt Leading to Poverty 
 
The poor is badly affected by the increased macroeconomic uncertainty and volatility due 
to high indebtedness. Slower growth in the economy reduces the employment generation 
capacity of the economy Increased precautionary savings caused by higher uncertainty 
about future income may increase poverty due to reduced growth. In addition, credit 
market effects, i.e. higher incidence of credit rationing or increased risk premium and 
borrowing rates for private firms may affect negatively the poor via fallen labor demand. 
Higher levels of debt may also increase the propensity of debt crisis. Debt crisis affect the 
income of the poor in the longer-run via asymmetric effects, i.e. poverty is less reduced in 
subsequent expansions than increased during contractions. Firstly expectations may be 
more pessimistic during phases of crisis than optimistic in booming times. Secondly, 
credits may be rationed to firms due to a higher perceived risk of default in recessions. 
This effect may not completely offset during expansions. Thirdly, inadequate insurance 
for poorer households may prevent the ability to smooth consumption with possible 
negative effects. Finally, unskilled workers may lose their jobs first in recessions if firms 
“hoard” their skilled labor force due to higher turnover costs. In addition to that during 
expansions companies may increase fixed investment if complementarily between skilled 
labor and physical capital is high, leading to persistent unskilled unemployment. 
Unfortunately, the poverty situation in Pakistan has become from bad to worst. The most 
important problem faced by the people of Pakistan is theirs absolute poverty. Low per 
capita income has also put the country among the poorest of the low-income nations in 
the world. According to the World Bank Reports, Pakistan is among the High Indebted 
Countries & Low Income Nations of the World. A bigger part of poverty in the country is 
due to low investments in the socio-economic uplift of the people at all levels. Due to the 
adverse effects of public debt on economy, the income generating capacity of a large 
number of the population has gone drastically down. The effects on the people have been 
devastating due to poverty. Education levels have gone down and illiteracy is rampant. 
School going children are out of school and working on road side workshops or 
restaurants. Health sector is in tatters. Children are dying of curable diseases. Economic 
opportunities in the country are disappearing fast because of lack of substantial economic 
growth in the country. Environment is degrading fast and affecting the lives and 
sustainability of both the people as well as the fragile ecology. The result is diminishing 
natural resources for future sustainability. As an example of Pakistan’s low investment in 
human development, the South Asian Institute’s Report clearly states, "While South Asia 
is the most illiterate region in the world, Pakistan is among the most illiterate countries 
within South Asia". 
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4.6 Public Debt and Social Development 
 
Public debt also causes increase in the interest expense which translates into reduction of 
the availability of funds for social development. The same is evident from Table 3 which 
shows that due to debt accumulation interest payments are consistently increasing at the 
expense of decreasing development expenditure. It is difficult to visualize a self-sustained 
process of economic growth without human resource development, particularly without 
high levels of investment in education and health. This is the fate that people of Pakistan 
are facing right from the beginning. The situation was worse during the 1990s period 
which resulted in low social development leading to low quality of life. While even in the 
period of high growth no solid development has been made to increase the quality of life 
of people of Pakistan. 
Many of the significant indicators of social and living standards in Pakistan have 
reportedly gone from bad to worst in the last five years. According to the Pakistan Social 
and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) survey 2005-06, the total enrolment in 
Government schools has been on a steady decline since 2001-02 when it stood at 74 per 
cent. The PSLM survey 2004-05 reported "decrease in the share of primary enrolment 
that is in Government schools. The overall share has declined from 72 per cent in 2004-
05 to 65 per cent in 2005-06." Full immunization of children has declined from 77 per 
cent in 2004-05 to 71 per cent in 2005-06. The survey reveals that more than 30 per cent 
population did not have toilet facility while more than 41 per cent people did not have 
any sanitation system. In Pakistan, World Bank estimates indicate that only 57 per cent of 
girls and women can read and write and in rural areas only 22 per cent of girls have 
completed primary level schooling, as compared to 47 per cent of boys. Around 89 of 
Pakistan’s 112 Districts are facing problems of food insecurity, including malnutrition, 
under-nutrition, hunger, diseases and poverty, according to a World Food Program study. 
The study, the first of its kind in Pakistan, was done to identify food insecure segments in 
urban areas of Pakistan. The study declares 39 Districts extremely vulnerable, 31 very 
vulnerable and 19 vulnerable to food insecurity. Among the Districts with food security it 
places 15 districts under the category of normal and eight under the sufficient category.  
Pakistan is a nation that is spending only 1.8 percent of its budget on Education, 0.5 per 
cent on its health. And where 80 per cent of its villages are without clean drinking water, 
sewerage, hygiene facilities, and 60 per cent are without electricity. Where one child 
under the age of 5 dies every 40 seconds and one child is born every 10 seconds. Where 
one mother dies in child birth every 90 seconds because of lack of health facilities. This 
situation no doubt raises concern of the world for deteriorating social condition 
notwithstanding the aid and fund being deployed by different world organizations in 
Pakistan. 
4.7 Public Debt and Inflation 
 
As we know that public debt consists of domestic and external debt Government has 
different sources to obtain domestic debt i.e. Central bank, commercial banks and non 
banking financial resources. If the borrowing is done through central bank, than it results 
Page 10 of 23 
in the increase of money supply. This further results in excessive increase in demand 
which translates into inflation. This in the end makes the poor worst off who was already 
having difficulty in making the ends meet. The same thing has happened in Pakistan in 
the current period. In the last 4 years, government has obtained excessive debt from the 
State Bank. The absolute increase in domestic debt is more than Rs. 1 trillion which 
depicts an increase of 55% from 2004 to 2008. This increase has resulted in highest ever 
inflation rate for Pakistan. Pakistan’s overall annual inflation rate peaked at an all-time 
height of more than 24.3 per cent in July 2008 from about 21.5 per cent in June. Prices of 
non-perishable food items rose about 35.4 per cent year on year in July 2008 while those 
of perishable food items rose about 22.8 per cent. This has happened due to excessive 
borrowing from State bank to some extent along with cost push inflation all over the 
world. 
4.8 External Front 
 
On the external front, when a nation is spending $ 2 to 3 billion on debt servicing out of 
total foreign exchange earnings of $ 7 to 8 billion how can it finance imports worth $ 9 to 
10 billion? Naturally, it had to go to with a begging bowl to borrow $ 3 to 4 billion every 
year. How can it maintain its financial sovereignty with a begging bowl in its hand? This 
is what has happened in the era of 1990s. 
 
Pakistan sustained a current account deficit of 4 percent of GDP in the 80s, 4.5 per cent 
in the first half of the 90s and 5.2 per cent during 95-96 and 98-99. This is a huge number 
for a poor country like Pakistan. Naturally when a country sustains such a large gap in 
external accounts, it has to borrow to fill this gap. Pakistan’s external debt and foreign 
exchange liability continued to rise reaching as high as $ 38 billion by 98-99. Pakistan’s 
export remained stagnant around $ 8 billion for 6 years in a row. In the mean time inflow 
of workers remittances also continue to decline from $ 1.9 billion to less than one billion 
dollars. On the other hand, Pakistan's external debt and foreign exchange liability 
continued to raise, therefore, the country's debt carrying capacity started eroding. In 
1980- 81, external debt liability as percentage of foreign exchange earnings was 147 per 
cent, by the end of the 80s it stood at 257 per cent. As we entered into the 90s, the debt 
burden deteriorated and by 98-99 it stood at 335 per cent. In other words, Pakistan's 
external debt burden was even worse than many countries. This suggests that Pakistan 
was in league with countries like Liberia, Congo, Malawi, Rwanda etc. This was the state 
of affairs on external front. Pakistan almost lost its financial sovereignty. Credit rating in 
international capital market was at its lowest. No country or institution was ready to lend 
to Pakistan because of its fragile balance of payment position. No nation can survive as a 
sovereign state in such circumstances. 
 
The day of 9/11 appeared to be a turning point for Pakistan’s economy. By allying with 
USA and Europe in the so called war against terrorism, Pakistan was able to enjoy certain 
privileges which enabled it to ease off the extensive pressure on the economy U.S 
assistance has played a key role in moving Pakistan's economy from the brink of collapse 
to setting record high levels of foreign reserves and exports, dramatically lowering levels 
of solid debt. During this period External debt & liability decreased by $2.5 billion in 7 
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years. External debt & liability as % of GDP which was 64% in 1999 decreased to 28.3% 
in 2006. And External debt & liability to foreign exchange earnings ratio which was 
335% in 1999 decreased to 128% in 2006. 
 
However, this improving trend didn’t last long External debt and liability situation has 
started further deteriorating. As can be seen in table 8, most of the debt sustainability 
indicators have shown adverse trends. External debt & liability as a percentage of GDP 
has become 33.5%. It has shown a 20% increase in just one year.  External debt & 
liability as percentage of foreign exchange has increased to 155%, showing an increase of 
25%. External debt & liability to foreign exchange reserve ratio has become 4.7, showing 
an increase of 57%. Interest payment as a percentage of foreign exchange earning has 
become 4.1%, depicting an increase of 28% since 2007.  The most contributing factor in 
the sharp increase in these indicators is large depreciation in the rupee. From the present 
figures it can be calculated that with every one rupee depreciation in our currency against 
US dollar, Pakistan’s external debt increases by Rs 47 billion. It is interesting to note that 
during fiscal year 2007-08, the greenback appreciated against the rupee by more than 
fifteen rupees. This means that if no additional external debt was obtained in current 
fiscal year than just because of the depreciating Rupee, Pakistan’s external debt has 
increased by Rs. 600 billions since December 2007. This reflects a 24% increase in the 
external debt in terms of Rupees. Other significant factors of deteriorating external debt 
indicators are sharp increase in imports, sluggish growth of export and declining foreign 
direct investment and portfolio flows negatively affecting Pakistan’s external liquidity 
position, given its large current account deficit of about 6.8 per cent of gross domestic 
product. Due to situation developing in the external sector, our country encounters 
increasing difficulty in refinancing its external debt as lenders’ risk aversion toward 
Pakistan has increased. According to Moody’s credit rating, many of the credit stresses, 
which led to downgrading of Pakistan's sovereign credit ratings to B2 from SI in May 
2008, are still present.  Foreign exchange reserves of the country are depleting fast and 
stood at only $9.13 billion on 30th August 2008 compared to a record high of $16.5 
billion in October last year. Of these reserves, only $5.76 billion are held by the State 
Bank and are freely usable. In short Pakistan is currently facing unsustainable level of 
external debt and liabilities. With the present trend continuing in future, it looks like we 
are sleep walking towards a default and an eventual economic collapse. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
From the discussion presented above, it is evident that public debt has played havoc with 
the economy of our country. Deterioration in most of the economic indicators and some 
of the social indicators are end results of the unsustainable level of public debt. The major 
factors contributing towards accumulation of debt are twin deficit that our country faces. 
Government need to finance its deficit which itself is a burden on the economy as the 
expenditure side further inclines due to rising interest expense. Our governments have not 
properly managed and planed to cut down its deficits due to which the gap between 
revenue and expenditure has increased, forcing the country to obtain more debt in each 
fiscal year. High level of public debt has held back the government to meet its 
macroeconomic objectives of economic growth, price stability and viable external 
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balance of payment. Without achieving the macroeconomic objectives, government 
cannot achieve its social objectives as well. The major implications of public debt are 
sluggish economic growth, macroeconomic uncertainty, decreasing development, 
investment crowding out, inflation, higher unemployment, deteriorating social conditions 
and rising poverty. These factors have also contributed to destabilize the macroeconomic 
condition in case of Pakistan. The current situation that we face is due to inefficiency of 
the past governments; however, the situation has become worst in last few years. 
Pakistan’s current leadership is under immense pressure in order to suppress the current 
weakening economic condition. If some thing hasn’t done immediately than economic 
collapse of our country is for certain. It is therefore essential for the government to 
properly manage and lower public debt level in order to take charge of the havoc being 
played with the economy by unsustainable level of public debt. In order to so, 
government must take immediate step to lower its twin deficit. Government must come 
up with policies and structural reforms to increase the revenue and lower its current 
expenditure. In addition to that, it must proficiently plan the retirement of the existing 
debt along with managing the debt servicing. Finally it will require competence and 
expertise to ensure affective implementation of the plan. It is time to join heads and hands 
to stabilize the macroeconomic conditions of our country in order to prove the world that 
Pakistan is not a failed state. 
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Annex A - Tables 
Table 1:   Pakistan’s Public Debt  
                           Rupees in Billion (Stated Otherwise) 
Year Domestic Debt 
External 
Debt Total Debt 
Domestic 
Debt 
External 
Debt Total Debt 
 Rupees in Billion As % of GDP 
1972-73 17.8 32.3 50.1 26.6 48.3 74.9 
1976-77 32.7 53.6 86.3 21.8 35.8 57.6 
1979-80 56.8 70.7 137.5 24.3 30.2 54.5 
1980–81 60.1 73.9 134 21.6 26.7 48.3 
1984-85 143.9 140.2 284.1 30.5 29.7 60.2 
1985-86 200.1 186.8 387.6 39.0 36.3 75.3 
1986-87 247.3 208.6 455.9 43.2 36.4 79.6 
1987-88 288.6 232.4 521 42.7 34.4 77.1 
1988-89 331.1 299.4 630.5 43.0 38.9 81.9 
1989-90 378.3 328.9 707.2 44.4 38.4 82.6 
1990-91 445.1 436.3 821.1 43.6 38.4 80.5 
1991-92 521.8 436.3 958.1 43.1 36.0 79.1 
1992-93 602.4 517.2 1119.6 44.9 38.6 83.4 
1993-94 702 749.4 1451.4 44.6 47.6 92.2 
1994-95 798.6 785.1 1731.7 42.4 41.7 84.1 
1995-96 908.9 951 1859.9 42.4 44.4 86.8 
1996-97 1041.9 1127.3 2169.2 43.3 46.9 90.2 
1997-98 1151.4 1366.9 2518.3 41.7 49.5 91.2 
1998-99 1389.3 1581.9 2971.2 47.7 54.3 102.0 
1999-2000 1576 1442 3018 41.2 38.0 78.9 
2000-01 1728 1761 3489 41.5 42.3 83.8 
2001-02 1715 1795 3510 39.0 40.8 79.8 
2002-03 1852 1766 3618 38.4 36.6 75.3 
2003-04 1979 1810 3789 35.1 32.1 67.8 
2004-05 2152 1913 4064 33.1 29.4 62.5 
2005-06 2322 2041 4363 30.5 26.8 57.2 
2006-07 2601 2213 4814 29.8 25.4 55.2 
2007-08 3016 3384 6400 28.7 32.2 64.3 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
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Table 2:   Growth Rates of Different Economic Indicators  
                        (Growth Rates in Percentage) 
Year Real GDP Growth 
Debt 
Growth Inflation 
Real 
Revenue 
Growth 
Real 
Investment 
Growth 
1981 6.2 5.0 11.9 9 6.2 
1982 6.5 30.8 5.9 36.9 13.68 
1983 6.8 19.8 6.4 7.7 3.33 
1984 5.1 13.2 6.1 15.7 5.91 
1985 7.6 21.6 5.6 1.4 7.21 
1986 5.5 24.6 3.5 12.5 8.09 
1987 6.5 18.7 4.7 9.2 8.78 
1988 7.6 12.9 8.8 7.4 2.31 
1989 5.0 19.5 7.9 9.6 11.76 
1990 4.5 14.5 9.1 5.7 2.28 
1991 5.5 20.7 12.6 -8.9 6.68 
1992 7.8 13.8 4.9 29.9 21.36 
1993 1.9 16.0 9.8 -5.7 3.94 
1994 3.9 15.3 11.3 1.8 -1.26 
1995 5.1 10.2 13.0 5.4 0.40 
1996 4.7 7.4 10.8 7.0 5.63 
1997 -0.4 16.6 11.8 -9.7 -8.04 
1998 5.3 16.1 7.8 11.0 6.00 
1999 3.5 18.0 5.7 8.2 -9.80 
2000 3.9 1.6 3.6 5.77 5.37 
2001 1.8 15.6 4.4 3.5 27.95 
2002 3.1 0.6 2.5 10.36 9.53 
2003 4.7 3.1 3.1 12.38 7.54 
2004 7.5 4.7 4.6 5.58 9.84 
2005 9 7.3 9.3 4.06 23.34 
2006 5.8 7.4 7.9 11.7 25.38 
2007 6.8 10.3 7.8 12.76 13.08 
2008 5.8 33.0 21.0 7.6 1.56 
           Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
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Table 3:   Trends in Components of Expenditure  
                               Rupees in Billion (Stated Otherwise) 
Year   
 Total  
Expenditure   
Current 
Expenditure 
Interest  
Payments 
Defense 
Expenditure 
Development 
Expenditure 
Interest  
Expenditure 
Defense  
Expenditure 
Development 
Expenditure 
 Rupees in Billion As % of Total Expenditure 
 1980-81   63.6 37.8 5.9 15.3 25.8 9.3 40.5 68.3 
 1984-85   116.8 83.7 16.5 31.8 33.1 14.1 38.0 39.5 
 1988-89   201.2 153.1 38.1 51.1 48.1 18.9 33.4 31.4 
 1989-90   221.6 165.6 46.7 58.7 56.1 21.1 35.4 33.9 
 1990-91   260.9 195.7 50 64.6 65.3 19.2 33.0 33.4 
 1991-92   321.5 230.1 62.4 75.7 91.3 19.4 32.9 39.7 
 1998-99   615 547.3 220.1 143.5 98.3 35.8 26.2 18.0 
 1999-2000   709.1 626.4 262.2 150.4 95.6 37.0 24.0 15.3 
 2000-01   717.9 645.7 249.3 131.2 89.8 34.7 20.3 13.9 
 2001-02   826.3 700.2 273.9 149.3 126.2 33.1 21.3 18.0 
 2002-03   898.1 781.9 199.8 159.7 129.2 22.2 20.4 16.5 
 2003-04   923.6 778.4 196.3 180.4 160.9 21.3 23.2 20.7 
 2004-05   1117 943.1 210.2 211.7 228 18.8 22.4 24.2 
 2005-06   1401.8 1121 237.1 242 326.7 16.9 21.6 29.1 
 2006-07   1663 1296 368.8 249.9 411 22.2 19.3 31.7 
 2007-08    1874.7 1378.2 602 275 493 32.0 20.0 35.8 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys  
 
Table 4:   Debt Indicators in relation to GDP and Revenue  
                         (In Percentage) 
Year  Public Debt  Interest  Expense Public Debt  
Interest 
Expense Interest Expense Interest Expense  
 As % of GDP As % of Revenue As % of tax revenue 
As % of non-tax 
revenue 
1980-81 48.16 2.12 285.11 12.55 - - 
1984-85 60.22 3.50 367.53 21.35 - - 
1988-89 81.88 4.95 453.27 27.39 - - 
1989-90 83.00 5.48 445.34 29.41 - - 
1990-91 80.43 4.90 500.98 30.51 38.57 116.61 
1991-92 79.14 5.15 442.54 28.82 37.62 93.71 
1998-99 102.01 7.56 634.06 46.97 56.82 279.88 
1999-2000 78.90 6.85 588.88 51.16 64.06 244.80 
2000-01 83.79 5.99 630.92 45.08 56.48 221.75 
2001-02 79.82 6.23 562.41 43.89 57.14 188.75 
2002-03 75.02 4.14 502.01 27.72 36.02 121.84 
2003-04 67.20 3.48 477.14 24.72 31.65 105.50 
2004-05 62.51 3.23 451.46 23.35 32.01 87.38 
2005-06 57.31 3.11 405.26 22.02 29.95 81.96 
2006-07 55.15 4.19 370.88 28.19 38.41 108.34 
2007-08 61.80 5.71 440.60 40.70 54.70 157.90 
 Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
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Table 5:   Outstanding External Debt and its Growth   
  US $ in Million (Stated Otherwise) 
Year Long term Short/ medium  term Total Long term 
Short/ 
medium  term Total 
 US $ in million Growth rates (%) 
1991 15,471 1,856 17,327    
1992 17,361 2,057 19,418 12.2 10.8 12.1 
1993 19,044 2,800 21,844 9.7 36.1 12.5 
1994 20,322 4,139 24,461 6.7 47.8 12 
1995 22,117 4,409 26,526 8.8 6.5 8.4 
1996 22,275 5,460 27,735 0.7 23.8 4.6 
1997 23,145 5,140 28,285 3.91 -5.9 1.98 
1998 23,042 5,940 28,982 -0.45 15.6 2.46 
1999 33600 6,572 38900 45.82 10.6 34.22 
2000 29820 5,622 35890 -11.25 -14.5 -7.74 
2001 32100 5000 37100 7.65 -11.06 3.37 
2002 31600 3132 34732 -1.56 -37.36 -6.38 
2003 33300 2100 35400 5.38 -32.95 1.92 
2004 35280 2000 37280 5.95 -4.76 5.31 
2005 35530 1800 37330 0.71 -10.00 0.13 
2006 37430 1600 39030 5.35 -11.11 4.55 
2007 40470 1500 41970 8.12 -6.25 7.53 
2008 46390 1300 47690 14.63 -13.33 13.63 
  Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
Table 6:   Total External Debt and Debt Servicing Indicators  
              US $ in Million (Stated Otherwise) 
Year External Debt Debt Servicing Interest Payment External Debt Debt Servicing Interest Payments 
 US $ in Million As % of export 
1991 17327 1316 380 293.58 22.30 6.44 
1992 19418 1513 580 287.16 22.38 8.58 
1993 21844 1648 670 321.95 24.29 9.87 
1994 24461 1746 840 365.91 26.12 12.57 
1995 26526 2042 870 341.87 26.32 11.21 
1996 27735 2136 890 333.71 25.70 10.71 
1997 28285 2265 870 349.37 27.98 10.75 
1998 28982 2353 1000 343.63 27.90 11.86 
1999 38900 1638 1200 513.87 21.64 15.85 
2000 35890 1778 1190 422.83 20.95 14.02 
2001 37100 1546 1230 415.64 17.32 13.78 
2002 34732 1190 1015 380.00 13.02 11.11 
2003 35400 1327 925 327.78 12.29 8.56 
2004 37280 2978 842 302.84 24.19 6.84 
2005 37330 1461 910.8 259.42 10.15 6.33 
2006 39030 1572 944.1 237.26 9.56 5.74 
2007 41970 1748 1,108.30 240.24 10.01 6.34 
2008 47690 1801 1134.7 266.87 10.08 6.35 
           Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
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Table 7:   Trends in Export, Import and Interest Payment 
    US $ in Million (Stated Otherwise) 
 Year   Export Import Interest Payment Exports Imports Interest Payment 
 US $ in Million  Growth rates (%) 
 1991   5902 8385 380 19.8 13.1 22.6
 1992   6762 8998 580 14.6 7.3 52.6
 1993   6785 10049 670 0.3 11.7 15.5
 1994   6685 8685 840 -1.5 -13.6 25.4
 1995   7759 10296 870 16.1 18.5 3.6
 1996   8311 12015 890 7.1 16.7 2.3
 1997   8096 11241 870 -2.6 -6.4 -2.2
 1998   8434 10301 1000 4.2 -8.4 14.9
 1999   7570 9344 1200 -10.2 -9.3 20.0
2000   8488 10033 1190 12.1 7.4 -0.8
2001 8926 10195 1230 5.16 1.61 3.4
2002 9140 9434 1015 2.4 -7.46 -17.5
2003 10800 11300 925 18.16 19.78 -8.9
2004 12310 13600 842 13.98 20.35 -9.0
2005 14390 18990 910 16.9 39.63 8.2
2006 16450 24900 944 14.32 31.12 3.7
2007 17470 26980 1108 6.2 8.35 17.4
2008 17870 37000 1257 2.29 37.14 13.4
            Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
Table 8:   Trends in External Debt Sustainability Indicators 
                        Percent/Ratio 
Year EDL / GDP EDL / FEE STD & MTD / EDL INT / FEE EDL / FER 
 Percent Ratio 
1991 53.2 223.3 12.0 4.9 33.4 
1992 51.8 238.1 11.8 7.1 22.8 
1993 53.3 271.3 14.7 8.3 18.3 
1994 56.4 309.8 20.4 10.6 8.4 
1995 50.6 280.5 19.9 9.2 15.4 
1996 51.3 279.2 24.5 9.0 51.8 
1997 53.7 301.0 22.2 9.3 23.9 
1998 57.6 249.1 25.8 10.1 28.2 
1999 54.9 346.2 19.6 13.9 25.7 
2000 51.7 297.2 18.9 12.5 23.9 
2001 52.1 259.5 15.6 12.0 11.5 
2002 50.9 236.8 9.9 8.8 5.8 
2003 43.1 181.2 6.3 4.7 3.3 
2004 36.7 165.0 5.7 3.7 3.0 
2005 32.7 134.3 5.1 3.3 2.7 
2006 29.4 121.6 4.3 2.9 2.9 
2007 28.1 124.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 
2008 33.5 155.0 2.8 4.1 4.7 
                   Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
        EDL: External Debt & Liabilities, FEE: Foreign Exchange Earnings, FER: Foreign Exchange Reserves 
        STD: Short Term Debt, MTD: Medium Term Debt, INT: Interest Payment. 
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Annex B - Graphs 
Graph 1:  Public Debt Trend from 1971 to 2008    
                                                                                                                                            (X Axis = Year, Y Axis = Rupees in Billion) 
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Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
 
Graph 2:  Total Revenue, Expenditure, Interest Payments Trend from 1981 to 2008 
                                                                                                                                            (X Axis = Year, Y Axis = Rupees in Billion) 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
1981 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Revenue
Total Expenditure
Interest Payment
        Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
 
 
Page 21 of 23 
Graph 3:  Growth Rate Trends of Economic Indicators from 1981 to 2008 
                                                                                                                                                      (X Axis = Year, Y Axis = % Growth) 
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Graph 4:  Interest Payment, Defense Expenditure & Development Expenditure as 
% of Total Expenditure Trend from 1981 to 2008 
                                                                                                                                (X Axis = Year, Y Axis = % of Total Expenditure) 
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Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
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Graph 5:   Long term & Short Term External Debt Trend from 1991 to 2008 
                                                                                                                                              (X Axis = Year, Y Axis = US $ in Million) 
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 Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
Graph 6:  External Debt Servicing, Principal Payment & Interest Payment Trend 
from 1991 to 2008 
                                                                                                                                              (X Axis = Year, Y Axis = US $ in Million) 
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Graph 7:  Trend in External Debt Sustainability Indicators from 1991 to 2008 
                                                                                                                                                 (X Axis = Year, Y Axis = Percent/Ratio) 
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 Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
 EDL: External Debt & Liabilities, Foreign Exchange Earnings, FER: Foreign Exchange Reserves, INT: Interest Payment. 
 
Graph 8:  External Debt & liabilities to Foreign Exchange Earning Trend from 
1991 to 2008 
                                                                                                                                                           (X Axis = Year, Y Axis = Percent) 
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  Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports and Pakistan Economic Surveys 
  EDL: External Debt & Liabilities, FEE: Foreign Exchange Earnings. 
 
